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STATEMENT QF THE FACTff 
The following terms used in Appellants1 Reply brief are 
defined as follows: 
1. Defendant AmSav means Defendant American Savings & Loan. 
2. Plaintiff Dakal means Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
3. Plaintiff Diversified means plaintiff Diversifed 
Equities, Inc. 
l,T_,L_n refers to the page and line of the Transcript of the 
hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick held on the 19th 
day of April, 1984. The sections of the transcript cited are from 
that portion of the transcript which contains the stipulation of 
the parties as to the facts. 
In addition to the facts set forth itx Plaintifffs Brief on 
Appeal, the facts important to this Reply ^rief are as follows: 
1. The cause of action between Plaintiffs and Defendant 
AmSav was submitted on the basis of stipulated facts. T4,L25. 
2. The only witnesses heard at trial provided testimony in 
connection with the defense of Defendant Knowlton (not before 
this Court on the appeal). T25,L22-T26,L3. 
v 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
I. RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS tS PROPER 
Defendant AmSav argued in its r^ponsive brief that 
Plaintiffs were unclear in the relief soug|ht on appeal, and that 
the relief sought by the Plaintiffs was iik conflict. Plaintiffs 
argue that there is no inconsistency in Plaintiffs1 seeking that 
this Court uphold Plaintiff Dakal's rights in the property while 
ordering that Plaintiff Diversified take title free of any 
interest in Defendant AmSav, as Plaintiff Qakal sold the property 
to Plaintiff Diversified. Plaintiffs merely desire their contract 
of sale to be enforced. 
II. RESPONDENT HAS MISSTATED THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF 
A CASE TRIED PURSUANT TO STIPULATED FA(JTS. 
Defendant/Respondent AmSav argues that a quiet title action 
is an action at lawf that Plaintiffs issues on appeal are 
factual, and that the scope of appellate review is therefore 
limited. Plaintiffs argue that the case was tried pursuant to 
stipulated facts and that, regardless of (whether the action is 
deemed in equity or at law, the challenge^ rulings of the trial 
court are conclusions of law subject to independent review by 
this Court. 
III. EVIDENCE CITED BY RESPONDENT AS SUPPORTING THE JUDGMENT WAS 
NOT, IN FACT, EVIDENCE BUT RATHER CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendant AmSav contains in its brief a lengthy section 
reciting what it refers to as evidence in support of the trial 
court's ruling. However, in nearly ever ca$e, the citation is to 
a finding of the court which, except insofar as repeating the 
stipulation of the parties, is a conclusion of law. The net 
vi 
effect is that Defendant AmSav : s merely citing conclusions of 
1 a w t o sup p o r t t h e c o n c 1 u s i o n s o f 1 a w o f the t r i a 1 c o ti r t.. 
ARG'JMEiVi1 
I . RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS/ APPELLANTS IS PROPER. 
R e s p o n d e n t f s £ i r s t a r g u m e n t e x p r e s s e s i t s o p i n i o n t h a t 
P1 a i n t i f £ s,/ A p p e 11 a i 11 s b r i e f i s i i n c 1 e a r i i i s t a t i i I g 11: i e i: e 1 i e f 
sought and the parties represented, and that it discloses a 
potentia] confli i ct o£ interest between Plaintiffs Diversified 
Equities, li ic. and Dakal. 
Any i:incertainty as t :: t: 1 Ie i:e 1 ie£ sought is dispelled by 
reviewing the Relief Sought on Appea1 £ound i n Appe11ant's brief 
in the context of paragraph ] 8 of the Statement o£ $ acts o£ 
Plaintiffsf br ie£i 
P1 aintif f Ei" e r s ; f i r- d Eqi.it.es, Inc. pr ays 
that this Court reverse the judgment cf the 
Court below and IITM.-•*! r"1 :*-z ric;utF z r V~e 
subject property. 
Plaintiff Dakal, i.;_ pri.j ;-;Aat this *.««.:: 
reverse the judgment of the Court belc^ ar.d 
order tha~ Plaintiff Cakal, Tn - ••;:, -he 
subject property in fee simple, :''-•- r.nd clear 
of any interest whats^*--^ ~^rp->rJ.^-t 
American Savings & . •:-:. 
STATEMENT OF TEE FACTS 
18, The parties stipulated that following the 
closing but on the same day, Plaintiff Dakal 
sold the property to Plaintiff Diversified 
... the above-entitled action was commenced 
prior to the p a y m e n t of. any part o£ the 
purchase p:r:i ce, , 
Therefore, there is no inconsistency in the re^ici £.^grv ,:„ 
t h a t P1 a i n t i f £ D a k a 1 m e r e 1 y s e e k s t h a t : ..' .r • ; c -: t . . : :f-
p r o p e r t ] ?, t : w i t,, t c: c o n v e y t o P1 a i n t i £ f Diveibiriec, be u p h e * a / 
a n d P1a i nt i £ f Di ve rsi £ i e d seeks t h a t it take the property 
conveyed by Plaintiff Daka] free and clear of any i nterest of 
D e f e n d a n t P m S a v. H o w e v e r , a s P ] a i n t i £ f D i v e r s i £ I e d h a s y e t t o p a} ? 
t h e p r o m i s e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n d u e t o t h e c 1 o u d u p o n t i 11 e t o t h e 
1 
property, Plaintiff Dakal still has an interest in the property. 
There is not the slightest inconsistency in this relief, and 
certainly no actual or potential conflict of interest. 
II. RESPONDENT HAS MISSTATED THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF 
A CASE TRIED PURSUANT TO STIPULATED FACTS. 
Defendant/Respondent's third argument is that the 
Plaintiffs1 issues on appeal are questions of fact and therefore 
subject to limited appellate review. This position is clearly 
untenable, for the reason that the cause between the Plaintiffs 
and Defendant AmSav was submitted to the trial court on 
stipulated facts. Both common sense and the law dictate that a 
trial judge can make no finding of fact inconsistent with the 
facts to which the parties have agreed: "If a case is submitted 
on an agreed statement of facts, the trial court and the 
reviewing court are limited to the agreed facts and cannot make 
any findings of fact not conforming to the agreed facts." Henry 
£*. Miller Co. ^ . Wood, Tex.Ct.App., 584 S.W.2d 302,304 (1979). 
Consequently, any "findings" by the trial court must of necessity 
have been conclusions of law subject to review by this Court as 
such. 
While no Utah Supreme Court has been found which faces 
squarely the question of the standard of appellate review where 
an appeal is taken from a case tried pursuant to a stipulation of 
facts, numerous decisions from other jurisdictions establish that 
an appellate court has both the right and the duty to take an 
independent look at the undisputed facts and draw its own 
2 
c :: i i c ,1 u s i o i i s 11: i e r e f r o m. 
These cases support the premise set forth above -ha- in 
essence, any concIus ion drawn by a tr i a1 j udge fo - 1 "~• : r ~ ~ r e 
s i i b m i s s i o i i c: f a c a u s € • lb a s e 3 i i p c ! i I I 11 i d i s p \ I t e d f a c t s i s ; i 
of law subject to independent review by this Court: 
" T h e c a u s e w a s s u b m i 11 e d t o t h e t r i a 1 c o u r t 
on stipulated facts, documentary evidence and 
a r g u m e n t of c o u n s e l . W h er e no e xt r i n s i c 
evidence was introduced at trial to aid in the 
construction of the [insurance policy at 
issue] such construction is a question of law; 
thus, on review of the judgment we are free to 
make an independent determination.ff P a c i f i c 
Export ZafiJtfiifi it QhiihhlZ&^llls. indemnity 
Company, 57 Cal. App.3d 86, 8 8 (197 6) 
11 : a : :c: i :• 3 :il , = • A l b i o i i
 11ILl£Z.aic>x £&& i* Chicago and North Western 
Transportation Co., Iowa, 254 N.W.2d 6 (1977): 
' ' rhe challenged ruling of the trial court was 
I:  ased upon the facts established by the previously 
mentioned stipulation filed herein. Accordingly, 
this court's scope of review is as follows: 
"Where the facts are not in material dispute, 
ii iterpretation placed thereon by trial court becomes 
a ques tion of law which is not cone1us i ve on 
a pp e a 1 • •,f [ c i t i n g authorit y I . £i£ j ,M S E £ H J £ £ X 3L*_ 
Hawkeye Security Insurance Co,[citation omitted]." 
254 N.W.2d at 11 
The general r ule regarding review of fi ndi ngs based upon a 
stipulat i o n i s r e c i t e d i n jLtA-LSfi. i*. HLQ.&R t A la., 380 So, 2 d 7 9 2 
(1980): 
"Where the f a c t s of a case are un ' con t r acu ted 
t h e r u l e of law which s t a t e s t h a t t h e 
a p p e l l a t e cour t must defer to the :r:;-.! *->L:T: 
i n r e g a r d t o f i n d i n g s of £ a < -. v -. - o 
a p p l i c a t i o n . 
The f i n d i n g s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t in a c a se 
submit ted to i t on an agreed s t a tement of 
u l t i m a t e f ac t s p r e sen t s a ques t ion of law, 
and t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t , having t h e same 
means as t h e t r i a l c o u r t had of r e a c h i n g a 
c o r r e c t c o n c l u s i o n of law on the f a c t s 
w i l l c o n s i d e r i t as i f t r y i n g t h e case 
o r i g i n a l 1 y in o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e whether 
the facts warranted the judgment. 
54 C.J.S. "Appeal and Error:, sec. 1661 p580 
(1958) . 
Where the evidence before the trial court 
was undisputed the ore tenus rule is 
inapplicable, and the Supreme Court will sit 
in judgment on the evidence de novo, indulging 
no presumption in favor of the trial court's 
application of the law to those facts.[cita-
tion omitted].n 
Although the case at bar was submitted below pursuant to an oral 
stipulation of facts read into the record by attorneys for the 
parties and does not involve a written stipulation, clearly it 
can be said that this Court has the same opportunity and capacity 
as the trial court to weigh the evidence and draw its own 
conclusions. The trial court did not hear any witnesses in 
reference to the controversy between Plaintiffs and Defendant 
AmSav but rather was presented with a stipulation, and therefore 
could not be deemed to have had an opportunity to judge the 
credibility of witnesses. The meaning of that stipulation is a 
question of law to be determined based upon undisputed testimony. 
The case of Schroeder v. Borack, Mo., 592 S.W.2d 742 (1980) 
is also on point. The action sought a declaratory judgment of the 
rights of certain parties under an insurance policy, specifically 
whether the policy had been effectively cancelled, and was 
submitted to the trial court sitting without a jury on the basis 
of stipulated facts and exhibits. The Court held: 
"On these stipulated facts, the trial court 
concluded there had been no cancellation. 
While this was a court tried case, it was on a 
stipulation of facts and was not one involving 
resolution by the trial court of conflicting 
testimony. As was said in DxxfidalJB %-&. 
Cornerstone Bank [citation omitted],"The 
appeal is here upon an agreed statement of 
fact... Therefore,...the only question before 
this court is whether the trial court drew the 
4 
p r o p e r legal c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m the fa c t s 
stipulated.1.*.We must necessarily address the 
legal consequences of the facts before us and 
if, under these stipulated facts, plaintiff is 
not entitled to relief against [the insurer], 
• we must so declare." 592 1s.W.2d at 744. 
Therefore,, since the interpretation of the stipu 1 ated facts 
m a d e b y t h e c o u r t b e 1 o w i i I t h e c a s e a t b a i: c o n s t i 11 11 e s 
c o i :t c 11 i s I c n s o f 1 a w, 11 i i s C o u i: t: m u s t r e a c h i t s o w n c o n c 1 u s i o n a s 
td t h e l e g a l e f f e c t of t h o s e f a c t s and r e p l a c e t h e j u d g m e n t of 
t h e t r i a l m u r t w i t h I t s own c o n c l u s i o n s whei'p liipy d i !" f r>i " 
i"itierLJ u cause io j u b i n i t t e d upon an ag reed s t a t emen t ; o i t a c t c i t 
i o t h e d u t y o f t h i s c o u r t. o n a p p e a l t. o a p p 1 y 111 e .1 a w I., o s i J C h 
f a c t s a s , n n r t o 1 f I i: s t i n v1 nn c '•• a n d «»1 i r '••»'' '• ],>i «ig n" »• •Iri '• 
a c c o r d i n g l y , ' L c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d J" R i s t £.. Westli "Miia Oi l Q.of9 ok I 
385 P.2d 701,793 (1963). S i m i l a r l y , t h e Colorado Court; of Appeals 
has h e l d , "[ wl here . . . the Iscui'p which "we a d d r e s s 11- i jueut- inn !" 
l aw and t h e o p e r a t i v e f a c t s a r e . . . u n d i s p u t e d , we a r e nu t bc.ii.md 
by t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . " M a l t b y v. J . F . 
iJDaafifij. I n c . , Co 1 n. r f . A pp, f» 1 ? P n d fi 4 f fi 4 fI f 1 "I" R 1 ) 
While f a c t u a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the ca se a t b a r , Jones 
X*. Hink le , Utah,. 611 P.2d 733 (1980) i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r u l e 
of a p p e l l a t e review found i Hi ul DVH-I J i- 1 "ai/nep. TIIP ap pel "Lint. 
sought review ot an OLdec c}canting summary judgment in an a c t i o n 
upon a c o n t r ac t . f o r t h e s a l e of rea"I p r o p e r t y , Due t o t he 
r e q u i r e m e n t s of a motion for summary luduiirienl" The f a r t s in iJi'jiej; 
mu s t have been und I s y u t e d , w h e t h e r s t i p u l a t e d o i. no t:
 r and I: he 
ana logy t o a c a se on a p p e a l from s t i p u l a t e d f a c t s becomes c l e a r . 
Tn r e v e r s i n g t h e l u d g m e n t of" ! he (•  i i a T I'HIU I m li r'nin |- \\^\\] 
" " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t i s u t d i n a r i l y a q u e s t i o n of 
5 
l aw , and t h i s Court need not d e f e r to t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
c o n s t r u c t i o n [ c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ] , but w i l l make i t s own 
independent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the c o n t r a c t te rms." 611 P.2d a t 
735, As t h e r e i s no d i s c e r n i b l e d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h e 
in te rpre ta t ion of a wri t ten contract or of s t ipula ted fac t s , i t 
fo l lows t h a t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of agreed f a c t s i s a l so a 
question of law, and that t h i s Court need not defer to the t r i a l 
court 's construction of those fac ts . 
Other Utah case law is not in confl ic t with the holdings of 
the cases c i t e d above, or of P l a i n t i f f s ' ' reading of Jones 2^ 
Hinkle. While the rule of appellate review is ord inar i ly to defer 
to f ind ings of fac t of a t r i a l judge, the ru le i s g e n e r a l l y 
q u a l i f i e d : "Where the evidence i s in c o n f l i c t , we defer to the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i r s t - h a n d a s s e s s m e n t of t h e w i t n e s s e s ' 
c r e d i b i l i t y . . . " Hal Taylor Assoc ia tes 31*. Unionamerica, Inc . , 
Utah, 657 P.2d 743,749 (1982)(emphasis supplied); accord Fillmore 
City 3L*. Reeve, Utah, 571 P.2d 1316,1318 (1977) : "[wle follow the 
s tandard of review, t h a t where the evidence i s in c o n f l i c t , we 
assume t h a t the t r i a l cour t be l ieved those a spec t s of the 
evidence that support his findings." (emphasis supplied). In the 
case a t bar as between P l a i n t i f f s and Defendant AmSav, the 
evidence was not in c o n f l i c t but r a t h e r a l l of the f a c t s upon 
which the judgment of the t r i a l cour t was based was s t i p u l a t e d 
between the p a r t i e s . Accordingly, the implication of Hal Taylor 
Assoc ia tes and F i l lmore £i£y i s t h a t , where the evidence i s not 
in c o n f l i c t , t h i s Court need not defer to the judgment of the 
t r i a l cou r t . Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these Utah cases i s 
6 
•' i n i: i s t r 111 i I "in I In i i It L s J i n i . i I I h i i it In-, i J mi i I !•. "I i « I: 1 
d i s c u s s e d a b o v e . 
- ^ s i : *~ "i ? r v , . - r . *•
 f b e i n c 1 ^  ^ * >: ; * * - e •- : ~ ,~ 
p , * • 
facts nai" ^ r stiru.atc 
facts i ? c- ^ s r-^ + . o 
t.:tle is a- actirr - +. eq-.:: jee Sta^e v., Santiago, ' - ar., 
P • 2 d "^  "^  ~ / * ^ ~~ *•* } ^r"* i^" r - L ° *- #-* r- - K - - *-
review wn-;~ ":::e c„ f: *. r *-e c^pt-al 
upcn stipulated facts ard rV**i—-<- - — r;^ «= 
court stLpulatec 1~_tc:: . J ocrclusi p. or low, .;: *-; u 
may freely substitute I C S -*" ^ j-eni iui m a L ui t 
III. EVIDENT- CITED EV RESPONDENT A.: SUPPORTING T?i JUDGMENT 
NOT, IN FACT, EVIDENCE BUr: RATFFR CONCLUSIONS CP LAW. 
Beginninc - - : - .--*.• 
r . 1 i n J c: - ;. •= ^ .: - below, * 11, s- * t . a t i o r 
r e v e T ^ u- , —— - *.*--* r«.-:«-ddnt AmSav 
- . -^  _.. . , . 3ence a . • .: *_. .. . :. - ..t 
stipulated facts uni -*-:.: its, . ,„ :.*the: :t~ indingc 
Fact - * *-~^  * - -• 
cc -rt frcr stipulated facts, *.. ^  • lusicr. 
the parties. The r. ear.* no 
*- r ^. * ~erpre+ ••* he : 
a K f- n 
conclusions of law subject to independent review by the appel la te 
c o u r t . The c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t has l a b e l e d a 
conclusion of law as a finding of fact i s of no importance: "How 
t h e t r i a l c o u r t l a b e l s t h e f i n d i n g or c o n c l u s i o n i s not 
d e t e r m i n a t i v e ; t h i s cour t w i l l t r e a t i t for what i t r e a l l y i s . " 
Stgstny ^ jBpaxd &f Trustees SLL Central Baaliingtan Universi ty, 
Wash .C t .App . , 647 P.2d 496 ,502 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . C e r t a i n l y , any 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n as t o whe ther P l a i n t i f f Dakal s a t i s f i e d a 
reasonable duty of inqu i ry to l o c a t e any encumbrances on the 
p roper ty i s a ques t ion of law, for ," . . .what i s ' r e a sonab l e 1 on 
undisputed f a c t s i s a ques t ion of law." F u l l e r t o n Union High 
School D i s t r i c t ^ R i l e s , Cal.Ct.App., 188 Cal.Rptr . 897,906 
(1983). 
Accordingly, the c i t a t i o n in paragraph 3 (a) and 3 (b) on 
page 21 of Respondent's b r i e f to paragraphs 24 and 25 of the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s Findings of Fact to support the argument t h a t 
P l a in t i f f s had actual knowledge of the outstanding debt of the i r 
s e l l e r to Defendant AmSav is misleading, for in essence i t merely 
r e c i t e s a conclus ion of law as evidence to support a conclus ion 
of law, though i t be denominated a finding of fact. 
S i m i l a r l y , the purpor ted analogy s e t fo r th in Defendant 
AmSav's brief on pages 26-27 is misleading. The argument is made 
that the facts in the case at bar pa ra l l e l the s i tua t ion wherein 
a bank customer discovers an entry on a bank statement indicating 
t h a t $10,000 has been depos i ted to h i s account , knowing t h a t he 
didn't make the deposit , and then wri tes a check for that amount 
only to have the bank d iscover i t s e r ro r a t a l a t e r da t e . But 
wi th in the framework of t h a t analogy, P l a i n t i f f s are in the 
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position not of the account holder, but of a merchant who 
receives the check for $10,000 in the course of a sale, phones 
the bank and receives assurances that sufficient funds are on 
hand to cash the check, delivers the merchandise to the account 
holder, deposits and collects the check, and then two months 
later is requested to return the $10,000 after the bank discovers 
its error. The merchant in that analogy has inquired of the party 
best able to provide accurate information and has relied to its 
detriment on the representations made by the bank. It is the bank 
which has made the misrepresentation; it is the bank which should 
bear the loss. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Defendant AmSav raised three issues in its 
responsive brief not addressed in Plaintiffs1 brief. 
First, Defendant AmSav contended that Plaintiffs1 brief was 
unclear in setting forth the relief sought, and that a conflict 
of interest existed between Plaintiffs. A review of paragraph 18 
of the Statement of Facts of Plaintiffs' brief disposes of this 
argument by reminding Defendant AmSav that Plaintiff Dakal sold 
the subject property to Plaintiff Diversified and that the relief 
sought by Plaintiffs would merely give effect to the sale. 
Second, Defendant AmSav stated that Plaintiffs1 issues on 
appeal are based upon questions of fact and therefore subject to 
limited review. As set forth above, there never were any 
questions of fact for the trial court to decide since Defendant 
AmSav and Plaintiffs stipulated to the facts of the case. 
Therefore, this Court is reviewing questions of law and may 
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substitute its conclusions for that of the court below. 
Finallyf Defendant AmSav erroneously argued that the 
conclusion of the trial court that Plaintiffs had actual notice 
that Defendant AmSav had not been paid was a finding of fact. 
This was not stipulated by the parties in their agreed statement 
of the facts, and any construction of the stipulated facts by the 
court below that Plaintiffs had actual notice of the claim of 
Defendant AmSav was clearly a conclusion of law. 
Plaintiffs pray that this Court reverse the judgment of the 
trial court as requested in Plaintiffs1 trial brief. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1985. 
Arthur M. Strong Jerome H. Mooney 
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